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This paper examines the role of local labor markets in determining how long families receive
benefits from the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. Given the current policy
emphasis on devolution and reducing the AFDC caseload through employment, understanding the role
of local labor demand is important. The study uses a unique data set, based on administrative data, that
has detailed information on welfare spells for over 100,000 AFDC cases. The empirical work is based
on estimates of a duration model where the hazard rate is a function of demographic characteristics,
local labor market variables, neighborhood characteristics, county fixed effects, and time effects.
Several alternative measures of local labor market conditions are used; the results show that higher
unemployment rates, lower employment growth, lower employment-to-population ratios, and lower
wage growth are associated with longer welfare spells. On average, a typical employment fluctuation
over the business cycle, if permanent, would lead to an 8–10 percent reduction in the AFDC caseload.
Typical changes in real quarterly earnings generate somewhat smaller effects. The combined effect of
these two changes, if permanent, would lead to sizeable reductions in the caseload, on the order of 15
percent. The estimated labor market effects are robust to including county-level fixed effects and time
effects. AFDC-UP participants, blacks, and residents of urban areas are more sensitive to changes in
economic conditions while teen parents and refugee groups are found to be much less sensitive to
changes in local labor market conditions.Earlier work found that marriage was the most common route off welfare (Bane and Ellwood
1
1983). Marriage may represent a more permanent route off welfare as those exiting via work are more
likely to return to welfare (Pavetti 1993). 
Local Labor Markets and Welfare Spells:
Do Demand Conditions Matter?
1. INTRODUCTION
There is currently a great deal of interest among policy makers and the general public in
reforming the welfare system. While there are divergent views as to how the programs should be
reformed, there seems to be a consensus that employment should play a central role in reducing
reliance on public assistance. Most prominent proposals for modifying the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program, for example, involve increasing the work activities of recipients
through mandatory work programs, training programs, or time-limiting of benefits. However, despite
the belief that pursuing employment strategies will reduce welfare dependency, little is known about
the factors that contribute to achieving independence.
What we do know is that employment has become a very important factor in facilitating
transitions off welfare. Among female-headed households, the characteristic most commonly
associated with an exit from welfare is the change in the employment status of the mother, which
accounts for as much as one-half of exits among AFDC recipients (Blank 1989; Blank and Ruggles
1996; Fitzgerald 1995; Gritz and MaCurdy 1992; Harris 1993; Pavetti 1993).  However, remarkably
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little is known about the factors that determine these exits from welfare. The literature has examined
the importance of supply-side factors—e.g., education, family structure, job training and placement
programs, and the availability of transitional benefits for child care and medical care—as well as the
role of program incentives—e.g., the benefit level and implicit tax rate on earned income. At the same2
time, we would also expect that the level of wages and availability of job opportunities would affect the
length of time on welfare. These demand-side factors have received little attention in the literature.
Understanding the link between macroeconomic conditions and welfare utilization is important
for several reasons. First, to what extent can economic growth alone reduce welfare reliance? Can a
regime of high employment growth and increasing real earnings significantly reduce the welfare rolls?
Second, understanding the role of local labor market conditions may also be of direct importance to the
policy debate. An integral part of almost all existing welfare reform proposals is a time limit on welfare
benefits and many states are currently experimenting with imposing these limits (Savner and Greenberg
1995). Although this represents a significant change for public assistance programs in the United States,
the new program would more closely resemble the Unemployment Insurance (UI) system, where
benefits are initially limited to a period of 26 weeks. Implementing a time limit, however, raises the
issue of equity across areas which have varying labor market conditions. The UI system addresses this
by extending benefits for an additional period if the state has relatively high unemployment rates.
Linking time limitations in welfare receipt to local unemployment rates has been raised in welfare
reform discussions but was abandoned, in part because the empirical research provided no evidence
supporting a link between local labor markets and welfare dependency. Further, devolution of
responsibility to the states would result in less opportunities for risk-pooling across areas, leaving the
state vulnerable to labor market shocks. This is reflected in proposals to set up “rainy day” funds to
cover such possibilities (Sawhill 1995).
  The available evidence does not make a strong case for a link between length of time on
welfare and labor market conditions. This literature, however, suffers from two limitations. First, most
studies utilize state-level labor market controls that may not accurately measure employment
opportunities. This literature consistently finds small and statistically insignificant effects. For example,
Hoynes and MaCurdy (1993, 1994) find that labor market conditions, measured by state unemployment3
rates and average wages, play no role in explaining changes over time in the length of welfare spells
among female heads of household. Other studies (Fitzgerald 1995; Harris 1993; Sanders 1992) use a
county or grouped counties to define local labor markets and find mixed evidence on the importance of
the labor market. These studies, however, rely primarily on cross-area differences to identify the effect
of labor markets. These estimates may be biased, to the extent there may be omitted variables
correlated with both labor market conditions and AFDC utilization. For example, welfare recipients
with low education levels and little labor market experience may be more likely to live in areas with
adverse labor markets. In this case, incomplete measures of individual characteristics would lead to an
overestimate of the effect of labor markets. The importance of these cross-area differences has not been
demonstrated in the literature.
  A significant barrier to doing research on the impact of local labor markets is the data
requirements. First, one needs longitudinal data in order to track welfare spells. Second, one needs
information on geographic location to assign local labor market variables. Lastly, one needs sufficient
sample sizes to examine a broad set of covariates for the relevant subsamples of the recipient
population. No data set used in the literature satisfies these conditions. Researchers in this area have
primarily relied on the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), but have also used the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).
The geographic area identified in these data is typically the state (PSID, SIPP) or SMSA, and
sometimes county (NLSY). In all of these surveys, the sample sizes for female heads of household
receiving welfare are quite small, on the order of 1,000 for the PSID, the SIPP, and the NLSY.
This study uses a unique new data set to comprehensively examine the role of local labor
market conditions in determining how long families receive benefits in the AFDC program. The
Longitudinal Database of Cases (LDB) contains a 10 percent sample of all AFDC cases in California
from 1987 to 1992. The sample is based on administrative data and includes information on monthly4
utilization of AFDC for about 100,000 cases over this period (UC Data 1994). The data set identifies
the county and zip code of residence, which are then used to assign labor market variables at the county
level while controlling for the characteristics of the neighborhood of residence using summary
tabulations from the 1990 Census. Many measures of local labor market conditions are used, including
unemployment rates, employment growth by sector, employment-to-population ratios, average earnings
by sector, and industrial composition of employment.
The LDB data also contain demographic information that is used to examine how the
determinants of welfare experiences differ for families with different characteristics. For example, two-
parent families are also eligible to receive benefits as part of the AFDC-Unemployed Parent (AFDC-
UP) program yet differ from female heads of household in terms of their labor market history,
characteristics, and behavioral responses to program changes (Hoynes 1996). However, they represent
less than 10 percent of the total AFDC caseload (U.S. House of Representatives 1994) and,
accordingly, have received little attention in the literature. The empirical model allows for differences
between female heads of household and intact families; for teen and nonteen parents; for urban and
nonurban families; and for various racial and ethnic groups. This is important not only for examining
which groups are more likely to benefit from strong economic conditions, but also for examining some
as yet unexplained higher rates of welfare dependency among various groups, such as blacks and urban
residents.
The results are estimated using a discrete duration model where the monthly exit probability is
a function of demographic characteristics, local labor market variables, neighborhood characteristics,
and fixed time and county effects. The results show that higher unemployment rates, lower employment
growth, lower employment-to-population ratios, and lower wage growth are associated with longer
welfare spells. The results are consistent across the different specifications for labor market variables
and are robust to including fixed county and time effects. Overall, the estimated effects are statistically5
Sanders (1992) finds a larger effect of labor markets on entry than on exit for a sample of
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young women. More generally, the literature examining routes into and out of welfare has focused on
the direct effects of labor markets. We might also expect indirect effects of the labor market through its
effect on family structure outcomes such as divorce and fertility (Duncan and Hoffman 1990).
significant and important. A 10 percent increase in employment or a 5 percent increase in real earnings
would lead to a 5–9 percent increase in the likelihood that a spell lasts one year or less. Blacks,
residents of urban areas, and AFDC-UP recipients are more sensitive to changes in economic
conditions while teen parents and refugee groups are much less sensitive to local labor market
conditions.
The broader policy question is to what degree do changes in economic conditions affect the
AFDC caseload and program expenditures. The size of the caseload is determined by entry rates and
length of spell conditional on entry, both of which may be affected by local economic conditions. I have
decided to focus my attention first on the determinants of the length of spell primarily because studies
examining the routes of entry into and exit out of welfare suggest that changes in labor market status
are more likely to be associated with exits from welfare than with entry into welfare (Bane and Ellwood
1983; Gritz and MaCurdy 1992). Bane and Ellwood state that “The fact that so few spells of AFDC
begin with earnings changes suggests that it is not typically the case that a female household head goes
on AFDC because she has lost her job, reduced her hours, or experienced a drop in wages” (1983: 19).
This may or may not be true, however, and future work will examine the effects on entry.
2
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on economic
effects of local labor market conditions on welfare and employment. Section 3 describes the data and
presents the descriptive statistics. Section 4 describes the empirical model and Section 5 presents
descriptive statistics for the estimation data set. The results are presented in Section 6; Section 7
concludes.6
For a review of the welfare dynamics literature, see Moffitt 1992. 
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2. BACKGROUND
Most of the literature examining the determinants of welfare dependency focuses on the supply
side as opposed to the demand side. Bane and Ellwood (1983) present the first estimates of spell
durations and the determinants of welfare dependency. They estimate the probability of exiting from
welfare as a function of individual characteristics, AFDC benefits, and length of spell, based on a
sample of female heads of household from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Similar
approaches based on a variety of different data sets are found in Blank 1989; Blank and Ruggles 1996;
Ellwood 1986; Fitzgerald 1992; Gritz and MaCurdy 1992; Harris 1993; Hoynes and MaCurdy 1993,
1994; and O’Neill, Wolf, Bassi, and Hannan 1984; and O’Neill, Bassi, and Wolf 1987.  These studies
3
estimate that the likelihood of leaving welfare decreases as the spell length increases and that spells are
likely to be longer for younger, unmarried, nonwhite women with larger families and lower education
levels living in states with higher benefit levels. Those studies that examine the routes off welfare
(Blank 1989; Blank and Ruggles 1996; Ellwood 1986; Harris 1993), find that the variables most
important for increasing the likelihood of an “earnings related” exit from welfare are education, work
experience, marital status (previously married), and number of children (fewer).
Although job opportunities are not the focus of these studies, most control for them in the state
by including the state unemployment rate; the coefficient is typically small and statistically
insignificant. This may be because the state is too large a jurisdiction for measuring labor market
opportunities. A few studies use county or grouped county-level labor market controls and find some
evidence that local labor market conditions matter. Harris (1993) uses the PSID and finds that women
living in counties with lower unemployment rates are more likely to have shorter spells and are more
likely to leave via work. Sanders (1992) uses a sample of young women from the NLSY and finds that7
The public release version of each of the SIPP data sets identifies only the state of residence.
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Fitzgerald received access to this confidential data on county of residence while working as a Census
Department Fellow. 
In addition, Blank (1989) uses SMSA-level unemployment rates and finds no significant
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relationship. Her sample, however, consists of data from only two cities, Seattle and Denver.
lower county unemployment rates lead to higher rates of entry into AFDC and lower rates of exit.
Fitzgerald (1995) uses a sample of female heads of household from the SIPP appended with “labor
market area” employment and unemployment data. These labor market areas are groups of counties
and resemble urban Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs), but they also group together
rural counties.  Fitzgerald finds that strong labor market conditions are associated with shorter spells
4
for blacks, but do not significantly affect whites.  In each of these studies, however, the effect of the
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labor market variable is identified primarily off of cross-area differences in labor market conditions. If
there are any omitted area characteristics that are correlated with the labor market variables, then the
results will be biased. For example, areas with high unemployment rates may be partially reflecting the
weaker job skills of their residents. Other omitted variables, such as differences in the cost of living and
county services for job placement and job search, may also be important.
The importance of omitted area variables is addressed by Fitzgerald 1994. When he introduces
labor market area fixed effects, the labor market variables become small and statistically insignificant
for both whites and blacks. He suggests that this may be due to insufficient variation in labor market
conditions over time (p.12), but may also be due to relatively small sample sizes. He pools the 1984 and
1985 panels of the SIPP, which yields 533 spells of welfare receipt for female heads of household. With
this sample, he includes 88 local area effects along with the labor market variables. 
Although the evidence from the literature on welfare spells is inconclusive, related studies
suggest that labor market conditions may be important for welfare recipients. Labor market variables
are significantly correlated with changes in the size of the AFDC caseload. As reviewed by Peskin8
This body of literature is quite large and my review is not meant to be comprehensive. I have
6
cited the studies most relevant for this analysis.
(1993), most of these studies look at the national caseload or the caseload in a particular state and very
few studies pool state-level caseload data. Peskin finds the elasticity of the AFDC caseload with respect
to changes in the unemployment rate to be 0.1 and the elasticity of the AFDC-UP caseload to be 0.5.
While these results are encouraging, the use of microdata is preferred to the caseload approach for
several reasons. First, the aggregate caseload literature combines the effect of labor market variables on
entry into welfare with the effects on the length of spell, conditional on entry. It is important to
differentiate between these two components of the caseload for both policy and measurement purposes.
Second, with microdata, one can examine how the sensitivity to changes in labor market conditions
varies across demographic groups, which may be important for policy purposes. Microdata can also be
used to look at recidivism and to examine how labor market variables affect short- versus long-time
recipients. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the aggregate caseload analysis gives more weight to
long spells, leading to an upward bias in the estimated effect if areas with poor economic conditions are
more likely to contain persons with a propensity to have longer spells. This is related to the problem of
length-biased sampling.
Many studies have examined the role that local labor markets play in affecting youth
unemployment (Acs and Wissoker 1991; Cain and Finnie 1990; Freeman 1981); racial differences in
labor market outcomes (Bound and Holzer 1993, 1995); and labor market outcomes more generally
(Bartik 1991, forthcoming; Blanchard and Katz 1992; Holzer 1991; Hotz, Xu, Tienda, Ahituv 1995).
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These studies almost universally find an important role for local labor market conditions. Another
related study shows that local labor market conditions affect the probability of marriage among low-
income women (Winkler 1994).
3. DATA9
LDB Data
The main data set for this study is the Longitudinal Database of Cases (LDB) compiled by UC
Data at the University of California, Berkeley, in association with the California Department of Social
Services (DSS) as part of the California Work Pays Demonstration Project (CWPDP). The goal of the
project is to document the dynamics of family poverty and welfare use in California (UC Data 1994).
The LDB sample consists of 10 percent of all cases receiving Medi-Cal (California’s Medicaid
program) for at least one month during the period from January 1987 to December 1992. Specifically,
the data set consists of a 10 percent sample of all cases ongoing in January 1987 plus a 10 percent
sample of all new Medi-Cal cases starting each year from 1987 to the present. A “new” case is one
where the person has not received Medi-Cal since January 1987. “Receiving Medi-Cal” means that the
individual holds a Medi-Cal card. It is not necessary that they actually receive benefits, just that they
are potentially able to. This study uses one subset of the LDB, persons receiving AFDC. Because all
AFDC recipients are categorically eligible for Medicaid benefits, they should be fully represented in
the LDB data. In fact, AFDC cases represent the largest group in the LDB data, accounting for over 30
percent of all cases. Other recipients of Medicaid are the elderly and disabled through the Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) program and AFDC-Medically Needy recipients, which each account for about
20 percent of the LDB cases.
The LDB data are compiled from administrative records and contain monthly recipiency
information from the time the case is first observed through the end of 1992. Each person in the sample
is followed throughout the sample period. If a person leaves welfare in 1990 and then returns in 1992,
both the earlier and later spell are observable. There are 97 different aid codes for each month of
recipiency and AFDC cases are easily identified from this information. The AFDC aid codes that are
identified include: single-parent families with children (AFDC-FG or Family Group), two-parent10
There are several other data sets that will eventually be released as part of the CWPDP. These
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include annual interviews with a small subsample to collect information on labor market connection,
family composition changes, income, and other demographic variables. These efforts will result in a
data set that includes all the strengths of administrative data (accurate spells, relatively large sample
sizes) along with the benefits of household survey data (lots of control variables). There are also plans
to match to state-level UI databases with IRS databases to collect employment information.
Even though Hispanics can be of any race, separate race and ethnicity variables are not
8
provided on the LDB. The data are assigned by the caseworker.
The public-use version of the data identifies all PUMAs and all counties with 100,000
9
residents or more. In addition, I was given access to the full set of county identifiers and the zip code
data.
There is some evidence of seaming in the LDB data. That is, a disproportionate number of
10
spells end in December, and, to a lesser extent, begin in January. California DSS analysts suggest that
this is a result of county record-keeping procedures.
families with children (AFDC-UP), AFDC refugee assistance, AFDC assistance for pregnant mothers,
and AFDC for foster children.
7
The data include these characteristics of the family: age, race/ethnicity, and gender of parent(s);
number, ages, and race/ethnicity of each child in the case; AFDC recipiency status; and residential
location. The ethnicity variable identifies white, black, Hispanic, as well as eight Asian groups, Native
Americans, and Pacific Islanders.
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This data set is uniquely suited for this analysis for many reasons. First, the sample size is
large—over 100,000 AFDC cases. This allows for the identification of important subgroups of
recipients, including two-parent families receiving AFDC-UP, and different racial/ethnic groups such
as blacks, Hispanics, and southeast Asians. Second, the data set contains information on the county, on
public-use microdata areas (PUMA), on SMSAs, and on zip code of residence.  Third, because the data
9
set is based on administrative data, the spells are accurately measured, without recall error.  The data
10
allow for the identification of monthly spells, whereas the PSID (the major data set used for similar11
The SIPP allows for monthly spells but it suffers from seaming problems (Blank and Ruggles
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1996) and a relatively short—32-month—survey period. The NLSY allows for monthly spells but is
only valid for the young cohort that it covers. Since 1984, the PSID has collected monthly AFDC
participation information. This is retrospective data and is collected at annual interviews.
As mentioned above, data for a subsample of the LDB data set (1,000 cases in four counties)
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has been supplemented with extensive demographic data obtained from household interviews. This will
be used to examine the sensitivity of the results to the excluded covariates. 
research) captures annual welfare spells.  As is well known, given that eligibility for AFDC is
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determined on a monthly basis, the use of annual data can create significant measurement error, or time
aggregation, problems. Data from California provide an excellent sample for this study because the
state contains over 15 percent of the nation’s AFDC caseload, more than twice the size of the next
largest state (U.S. House of Representatives 1994). Furthermore, the state’s caseload is unique because
of its racial and ethnic diversity and its sizeable AFDC-UP caseload. Lastly, the time period covered by
the data set includes a period of economic expansion and falling unemployment rates (1987–90)
followed by a recession with rising unemployment rates (1990–92).
However, the data set has important limitations. Because it is based on administrative data, the
demographic information about the recipients is limited. For example, marital status and education are
important determinants of length of time on welfare, but they are not available in the LDB data.  The
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approach for obtaining unbiased estimates in the presence of these omitted variables is discussed below.
Second, the survey is a sample of Medi-Cal recipiency, not AFDC receipt. If a woman starts receiving
AFDC but is never issued a Medi-Cal card, she would never appear in the sample. This problem is not
likely to be severe since the participation rate in Medicaid among AFDC recipients is over 97 percent
(U.S. House of Representatives 1994). According to state welfare analysts, application for Medi-Cal is
usually done at the same time the AFDC application is started. People who move out of state are lost
entirely and cannot be differentiated from people ending a welfare spell.12
According to discussions with county welfare administrators, the majority of spell disruptions
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of one month are due to recipients’ delay in submitting routine eligibility forms. 
An alternative is to use distributional assumptions to integrate out the welfare history for the
14
left-censored observation as described by Heckman (1981).
Ignoring multiple spells may reduce the efficiency of the results, but for the purposes of the
15
question posed here, it makes sense to treat spells individually as opposed to constructing some sort of
multiple-spell model. Examining recidivism is very important and interesting, but is being left to future
work when the welfare utilization data is merged with individual earnings data.
The monthly welfare receipt information is used to construct information on spells. Welfare
spells are defined to be a period of continuous AFDC receipt. However, interruptions of one month are
ignored in the construction of spells.  As is typical with panel data, the welfare spells in the LDB data
13
can be left- or right-censored. A left-censored spell is one in which the individual is observed to be on
welfare in the first period of the sample (January 1987), while a right-censored spell is one in which the
individual is still on welfare when last observed (December 1992). All left-censored spells are dropped
from the analysis because it is impossible to determine how long the individual has been on welfare and
therefore to control for duration effects in the model.  The remaining data cover all new spells started
14
after January 1987, a period of 71 months. Using this data, we construct a sample of all spells in the
data set, including repeat spells. Recidivism is quite common among AFDC participants and about one-
half of the cases in our sample have more than one spell. The model outlined in the next section treats
each spell independently. In future work, this assumption may be relaxed.
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This sample consists of about 250,000 AFDC spells, which results in about 4 million monthly
transitions (the unit of observation for the discrete duration model). Because of the large sample size,
the results presented here use a 1 percent sample of all Medi-Cal recipients, also released by UC Data.
The 1 percent sample contains a total of 23,560 AFDC spells. The final sample was obtained after
dropping all left-censored spells, cases with no children, UP cases without two parents, FG cases
without any parent, cases where the parents are older than age 54, and cases with miscoded race data.13
Dropping left-censored spells and “child-only” cases (no parent in the recipiency unit)
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accounts for most of the sample reduction. There are 5,783 left-censored spells; 4,670 child-only spells;
1,181 UP spells with only one parent; about 400 cases with parents over age 54; 50 with no children;
and 10 with improper race codes. Child-only cases are quite common in California, accounting for
about 20 percent of all AFDC cases (California DSS 1994). The most common reason for this is that
the parent(s) is undocumented. Because these parents are not in the aid group, I do not have any
information about them. This is also the reason for dropping UP cases with only one parent. Pregnant
women with no other children were not dropped as these women are eligible for AFDC in the last
trimester of their pregnancy.
Parents over age 54 were dropped because employment is less likely to be an option for them. After the
sample selection, there remain a total of 12,221 AFDC spells, or 191,294 monthly transitions.  About
16
7,100 are first spells and 3,600 are second spells.
Local Labor Market Variables
Local labor market variables are assigned to each recipient in each month they are on welfare
based on their county of residence. I consider several alternative labor market variables including
unemployment rates, employment, employment-to-population ratios, average earnings, and the
industrial composition of employment. All employment and earnings data come from quarterly UI
reports known as 202 data. The 202 data are establishment data, based on a large sample of employers
in various industries, and provide county-level employment and earnings figures by one-digit Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes on a quarterly basis. This is used to construct a time series of
county-level employment (total and by sector), average earnings (total and by sector), and employment-
to-population ratios. Average quarterly earnings are constructed by dividing total quarterly payroll by
quarterly employment. This is not a wage measure, but instead reflects expected earnings conditional
on obtaining a job. The earnings variable will increase when turnover is low and hours are high.
Industrial composition is constructed by dividing one-digit-level industrial employment by total
employment. Employment-to-population ratios use annual county population figures, which are
interpolated between decennial census years. Section 6 will explore the importance of wages and14
employment by industry with a focus on the retail trade and service sectors, as they are more likely to
employ the relatively low-skilled welfare participants (Brandon 1995).
Most studies have used unemployment rates as a measure of labor market opportunities, and I
consider them here as well. Unemployment rates at the county level are available monthly but must be
estimated using an imputation procedure known as the “handbook method” (U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics 1992). Several different data sources—including the Current Population Survey, UI data on
insured unemployment, and other establishment-level surveys—are used to construct these
unemployment rates for counties. As discussed by Bartik (forthcoming), because of its reliance on
multiple data sets, county-level unemployment rates may be subject to significant measurement error.
This could be particularly troublesome when the estimates are identified using cross-county differences
in the trends of labor market conditions, as is the case when county and time effects are included.
Furthermore, movements in the unemployment rate are affected by fluctuations in labor supply through
changes in the labor force participation rate. This is less likely to be the case with employment-based
measures. For both reasons, employment-based measures are preferable to unemployment-based
measures.
Critical to the study is sufficient variation in labor market conditions across areas and over
time. There is significant variation in labor market conditions within California. For example, in June
1991, unemployment rates varied from relatively low levels in northern urban areas (6.1 percent for
Oakland, 5.4 percent for San Francisco), to moderate levels in the southern urban areas (8.5 percent in
Los Angeles), to very high levels in the rural areas (12.2 percent in Fresno County). Figure 1 shows
unemployment rates by county for a few large and illustrative counties. Los Angeles County accounts
for about 35 percent of the state’s total AFDC caseload, while the other counties represented in the
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Alameda Fresno Los Angeles     Sacramento
Figure 1
Monthly Unemployment Rates for Selected California Counties, 1987-199216
In some cases the relevant labor market area may be larger or smaller than the county. While
17
subcounty data is, in general, not available, using SMSAs for labor market areas did not change the
results significantly.
Zip codes represent relatively small geographic areas. Census tracts generally contain about
18
4,000 to 5,000 persons, whereas zip code areas in California average about 10 to 20 times that size.
They are smaller than PUMAs, which contain at least 100,000 persons, and SMSAs.
southern California. Unemployment rates in the northern urban areas are generally lower than those
found in the south throughout the study period. Fresno County is an important agricultural county in the
state, and has the largest caseload outside the major urban areas. Unemployment is much higher in
these areas and is much more seasonal, reflecting the importance of the agricultural sector. This
variation will be important for the identification of local labor market effects.
17
Neighborhood Variables and Other County Variables
Because of limited demographic variables, I augment the LDB data by controlling for the
characteristics of the neighborhood in which the family resides. The neighborhood variables are
measured at the zip code level and are constructed from the 1990 Census summary files. These effects
are assumed to be constant throughout the spell since they are measured at a single point in time.
Variables examined include poverty rates, median household income, high school completion rates,
employment rates for men and women, percentage of families headed by single women, urban
composition, and percentage of women never married. Many of these variables are also tabulated by
race and ethnicity. In practice, these variables were found to be highly collinear, and only a subset is
used in the estimates. The literature on neighborhood effects, as reviewed by Jencks and Mayer (1990),
provides evidence that zip code or census tract areas are preferred to county, PUMA, or SMSA areas.
There are a total of 1,106 zip codes represented in the data, or about 26 per county.
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Resources spent on job training and education may vary significantly across counties.
Accordingly, the empirical work also includes measures of participation and cost of the Greater17
Avenues for Independence (GAIN) program. California’s GAIN program is the nation’s first and
largest welfare-to-work program and stresses education, basic skills, training, and job search. The
GAIN data are available annually and are used to construct two variables, county participation rate and
expenditures per GAIN participant.
4. MODEL
The length of time that an individual receives welfare can be thought of as the outcome of a
dynamic optimization process, where the individual compares utility on and off welfare at each point in
time. This should take into account not only current income (and utility) on and off welfare, but
expectations about future income given the participation decision made today. Primary routes off
welfare include labor market success (either increasing hours or getting a new job), and, for female
heads of household, marriage. A standard implication of dynamic utility-based models is that increases
in resources available on welfare (e.g., welfare benefits) lead to longer welfare spells while increases in
resources off welfare (e.g., higher wages, higher likelihood of jobs, greater marriage opportunities,
stronger labor market conditions) lead to shorter welfare spells. Thus, local labor market conditions
naturally enter the problem through changing current as well as future earnings prospects for the
parent(s) in AFDC families as well as the potential spouses of the female-headed recipients. Therefore,
we would expect that increases in employment and decreases in unemployment rates, through
increasing the probability of job market success, and increases in real earnings, through increases in the
returns to working, will decrease the length of welfare spells. Models of welfare participation also
incorporate the “costs” of participating in the program, which can include time and money costs of
application as well as the “stigma” or distaste of welfare participation. These costs were introduced as












An introduction to duration models can be found in Heckman and Singer 1984, Kalbfleisch
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and Prentice 1980, and Lancaster 1990.
Once a form for the hazard rate is specified, one can construct the estimates for the duration
20
distribution and survivor function using the properties of conditional probabilities. In the discrete case,




The determinants of welfare spells are estimated using a discrete time hazard model.  The
19
basic element of a duration model is the hazard or exit rate P(t,Z), which captures the probability of
leaving AFDC in the tth period given continuous welfare receipt for the last t-1 periods and covariates
Z. The hazard rate is used to construct two other distributions of interest: the duration distribution and
the survivor function. The duration distribution f(t,Z) characterizes the likelihood that an individual
experiences t periods of continuous AFDC receipt and the survivor function F(t,Z) depicts the
probability that an individual will experience a welfare spell that lasts at least t periods.  Both
20
distributions are conditional on covariates Z and on initial entry onto welfare. The probability of
observing an uncensored spell of length T is the duration distribution and the probability of observing a
right-censored spell is the survivor function. Thus, given functional form assumptions, the likelihood
function for the sample is
where the indicator variable   is equal to 1 if the spell is right-censored. i
Given a specification for the exit probability, the model is easily estimated using conventional
maximum-likelihood methods. Suppose we specify the exit probability is a function of the available
demographic variables and the time-varying local labor market variables. Estimates of the labor market
variables from this model may be biased for several reasons. First, there are omitted individual19
Dropping left-censored spells will likely lead to an upward bias in the labor market effects. In
21
this case, the results should be interpreted as the effects on new entrants. In addition, if those moving
out of state come from the worst labor markets, the estimates may be an underestimate. Manski’s
example (1993) of a spurious relationship between labor market variables and outcome variables is not
likely to hold here since welfare recipients represent a small fraction of the potential labor force and not
all recipients enter the labor force when they leave welfare.
characteristics that may be correlated with the labor market variables. For example, suppose that
persons with low education levels and poor employment prospects are more likely to be located in areas
with adverse economic conditions. Even if there was no relationship between welfare spells and local
economic conditions, the estimates would imply an effect. While this omitted variable bias is present to
a certain extent in all studies of local labor markets, it may be particularly problematic in this
application due to the limited number of variables in the administrative data. In order to address this
problem, as well as that of omitted county characteristics, I include both county-level fixed effects and
the zip code–level neighborhood variables. Second, the family’s residence may be endogenously
determined. If no family moves during the sample, then the county-level effects will also eliminate this
potential problem. However, families do move and if families move in response to changes in labor
market conditions, then the estimates will be biased. For example, suppose families anticipating a long
spell move out of their expanding labor market in response to higher costs of living. If they move to an
area with worse economic conditions, then my estimates will, as above, be biased upward. In an
extension of the main results, I use the family’s county of residence at the beginning of the spell to
assign labor market variables. Third, the composition of the welfare caseload may change over the
business cycle. When times are bad, one would expect that the marginal new entrant will have more
education and experience than those joining the rolls during good times. If that is true, then it will act to
dampen the estimated effects. Lastly, the LDB data do not identify what happens to welfare recipients
when they leave AFDC. Many of the recipients are undoubtedly leaving for reasons other than labor
market transitions. The estimated effects on earnings exits will be larger than those estimated here.
21P (t,Z)
exp( t Zit )
1 exp( t Zit )
.
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The combined benefit from AFDC and Food Stamps is equal to 70 percent of the maximum
22
AFDC benefit plus the Food Stamp maximum benefit, reflecting the fact that AFDC income is taxed in
calculating the Food Stamp benefit. AFDC benefits are set by the state and do not vary within
California. Food Stamp benefits are set by the federal government.
Alternatively, Blank (1989), Fitzgerald (1992), O’Neill et al. (1984), and O’Neill, Bassi, and
23
Wolf (1987) use continuous models to analyze welfare spells. Fitzgerald (1992) and O’Neill et al.
(1984) and O’Neill, Bassi, and Wolf (1987) use a complementary log-log specification that results from
aggregating the continuous proportional hazard into discrete intervals. Both the discrete and continuous
approaches easily allow for time varying covariates and unobserved heterogeneity. The discrete
approach generally has a computational advantage.
(2)
In the empirical work, the exit probability is modeled as a logit probability:
The   are dummy variables for length of the spell to date, accounting for the basic duration properties t
of the model. This nonparametric specification for the duration effects is very flexible and can easily be
implemented with the data set. To implement the specifications in the discussion above, the vector Zit
contains individual covariates, labor market variables, neighborhood variables, local area fixed effects,
and time effects. To control for the generosity of the welfare system, the regressions also include the
combined value of AFDC and Food Stamp benefits. This variable only varies over time, however, and
cannot be identified with time effects in the model.
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The logit specification has been used often in the literature (Bane and Ellwood 1983; Ellwood
1986; Fitzgerald 1994, 1995; Hoynes and MaCurdy 1993, 1994) and is attractive because it allows for
time-varying covariates, for a flexible form for the effect of time on welfare on exits, and is relatively
easy to estimate.  The specification also allows for easy interactions between the duration effects and
23
the economic determinants of welfare spells. The duration effects   determine how the exit probability t
changes over the spell and the covariates Z act to scale the exit probabilities up or down uniformly.
5. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS21
Table 1 compares the distribution of spell lengths in our LDB sample to estimates from other
studies using monthly data. The table compares estimates of the probability that a spell lasts at least six,
twelve, and twenty-four months. Each is a nonparametric (Kaplan-Meier) estimate which does not
control for any covariates. The first row shows that 72 percent of AFDC spells in the LDB data last six
months or more, and 36 percent last two years or more. These data are fairly consistent with the other
studies using monthly welfare participation data (Fitzgerald 1995; Blank and Ruggles 1996; Gritz and
MaCurdy 1992, Harris 1993). The Gritz and MaCurdy estimates imply longer spells but they are based
on a sample of young women, a group who typically have longer spells. The LDB data show somewhat
longer spell lengths compared to the SIPP, which may be due to California’s relatively high AFDC
benefits and differences in the composition of the AFDC population. 
To explore the differences in spells for demographic groups, Table 2 presents estimates of the
distribution of length of AFDC spell for families with various characteristics. The table presents the
probability that a spell lasts less than or equal to six months, one year, two years, and four years. Like
the estimates in Table 1, these are nonparametric and do not control for any covariates. Overall, 28
percent of spells last six months or less, while 38 last more than two years. AFDC-UP spells are
somewhat shorter than single-parent AFDC spells. While 49 percent of AFDC-UP spells end within
one year, only 45 percent of AFDC-FG spells end in that period. There are striking differences in the
length of spells for different racial groups. Thirty-one percent of spells end within six months for
whites, compared to 23 percent among blacks and 28 percent among Hispanics. Furthermore, teen22
TABLE 1
Estimated Unconditional Survival Probabilities:
Comparison of Recent Studies Using Monthly Data
Probability that AFDC Spell Lasts at Least 
Study Data Set 6 Months 12 Months 24 Months
Hoynes (1996) California LDB 1987–92 0.72 0.56 0.36
Blank and Ruggles (1996) SIPP 1986, 1987 n/a 0.45 0.25
Fitzgerald (1995) SIPP 1984, 1985 0.65 0.48 n/a
Gritz and MaCurdy (1992) NLSY 1979–89 n/a 0.67 n/a
Harris (1993) PSID 1984–89 (monthly) 0.76 0.56 0.36
a
Since 1984, the PSID has collected monthly AFDC participation information, which are retrospective
a
data collected at annual interviews.
The calculations from Harris 1993 measure the probability that the spell lasts greater than each of the
months shown in the table. All of the others measure the probability that the spell lasts greater than or
equal to each of the months shown.23
TABLE 2
Distribution of Length of AFDC Receipt by Demographic Group:
Unconditional Estimates
            Probability that a Completed Spell Lasts            
Number
of Spells <=6 Months <=1 Year  <=2 Years <=4 Years
All 12,221  0.28  0.46  0.62  0.75
Single-parent (AFDC-FG) 10,348  0.27  0.45  0.62  0.75
Two-parent (AFDC-UP)
1,873  0.31  0.49  0.63  0.72
White 5,835  0.31  0.51  0.67  0.79
Hispanic 2,855  0.28  0.45  0.61  0.74
Black 2,639  0.23  0.41  0.57  0.70
Asian refugee groups 458  0.10  0.19  0.31  0.43
Other 390  0.24  0.42  0.62  0.78
Nonteen head 11,120  0.28  0.47  0.63  0.76
Teen head 1,101  0.21  0.37  0.51  0.67 
Urban 10,647  0.27  0.45  0.61  0.74 
Nonurban 1,574  0.33  0.54  0.71  0.82 
Source: Author’s tabulation of LDB 1 percent case file.24
The “average” unemployment rate is constructed as a weighted average of each period’s rate,
24
using the caseload as the weight. The same is done for average employment-to-population ratios.
parents and families living in urban areas have longer spells than older parents living in nonurban areas.
To explore the relationship between local labor market conditions and the length of time on
welfare, Figures 2a and 2b plot the probabilities that a spell lasts a year or less against average labor
market conditions for each of California’s fifty-eight counties.  Figure 2a uses unemployment rates
24
and Figure 2b uses employment-to-population ratios. The points are weighted by the size of the county,
with larger circles representing larger counties. The general pattern supports the hypothesis that
stronger labor markets (lower unemployment rates, higher employment-to-population ratios) are
associated with shorter spells. The figures also show that California’s larger, more urban counties tend
to have stronger labor markets than the smaller, more rural counties.
Figure 3 shows the empirical hazard rate for leaving welfare. The circles indicate the estimate
of the hazard rate and the vertical line indicates the 95 percent confidence interval around the estimate.
After rising for the first few months, the hazard declines throughout the spell. This is consistent with
other studies.
Tables 3 and 4 present descriptive statistics on the estimation data set. Table 3 presents means
of all variables that are constant over the spell. About one-third of the spells are right-censored, which
is mostly accounted for by spells starting in the last two years of the sample. Spell lengths average
twelve months for uncensored spells and twenty-four months for right-censored spells. About 15
percent of the spells are AFDC-UP spells. The MALEHEAD variable is defined as equal to 1 if the
family is headed by a single male (and not a UP recipient). The PREGNANT variable is defined as
equal to 1 if the woman is pregnant with no other children in the household at the beginning of the28
TABLE 3
Descriptive Statistics for AFDC Spells
No. Nonmissing
Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum    Observations
Teen head  0.09 0 1 12,221
Head 20–24 0.23 0 1 12,221
Head 25–34 0.44 0 1 12,221
Head 35–44 0.20 0 1 12,221
Head 45–54 0.05 0 1 12,221
White 0.48 0 1 12,221
Hispanic 0.23 0 1 12,221
Black 0.22 0 1 12,221
Filipino 0.01 0 1 12,221
Cambodian 0.01 0 1 12,221
Laotian 0.01 0 1 12,221
Vietnamese 0.02 0 1 12,221
Other race 0.03 0 1 12,221
Number of children 1.65 1.11 0 12 12,221
Pregnant 0.09 0 1 12,221
a
Youngest child <=2 0.38 0 1 12,221
Youngest child 3–5 0.21 0 1 12,221
Youngest child 6+ 0.31 0 1 12,221
Male head 0.03 0 1 12,221
b
AFDC-UP 0.15 0 1 12,221
% right-censored (RC) 0.35 0 1 12,221
Length of spell, if RC=0 11.92 11.19 1 68 7,960
Length of spell, if RC=1 23.71 17.97 1 71 4,261
Source: Author’s tabulations of LDB 1 percent case file. The sample contains one observation per
spell.
Pregnant is equal to 1 if the woman is pregnant at the beginning of the spell and has no other children
a
in the case.
Male head is always equal to 0 when AFDC-UP is equal to 1. 
b29
This is verified by the birth of a child in the first 3–4 months of the spell. 
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Some cases in the LDB data were missing zip codes; 11,458 of the 12,221 spells have a valid
26
zip code.
spell.  PREGNANT and the dummies for age of the youngest child are exhaustive and mutually
25
exclusive.
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for variables that vary over the spell. There is one
observation for each of the monthly transitions in the data. The unemployment rate averages 7.5 percent
over the period while average quarterly wages are $6,699. All earnings variables are in 1992 dollars.
The employment-to-population ratio averages 0.40. The composition of employment is captured by the
nine employment-by-sector variables. Overall, services make up the largest sector, followed by retail
trade and manufacturing.
The neighborhood characteristics and GAIN variables are summarized at the bottom of the
table.  Urban-Inside is equal to one if, based on their zip code of residence, the family resides in an
26
urbanized area while the Urban-Outside variable is one if the family lives outside the main urbanized
area but still in an urban area as defined by Census. Eighty-six percent of AFDC cases reside in
urbanized areas while only 4 percent reside in rural areas. MEDHINC is the median household income
and FEMNVMAR is the percentage of women over age 18 who are never married. The GAIN
participation rate is the number of participants divided by the number of AFDC adults. The second
GAIN variable is the average GAIN expenditures per GAIN participant, which reflects the intensity of
the program.30
TABLE 4
Descriptive Statistics for AFDC Monthly Transitions Data
No. Nonmissing
Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum    Observations
County Labor Market Variables
Unemployment Rate 7.46  3.33  1.9  36.1  191,294
Average quarterly
earnings (1000s) 6.699  1.085  4.108  10.160  191,294
Average quarterly earnings,
Services (1000s) 6.585  1.046  2.842  9.642  191,294
Average quarterly earnings,
Retail (1000s) 3.920  0.408  2.084  5.201  191,294
ln(employment) 13.23  1.59  6.70  15.28  191,294
ln(service employment) 12.19  1.61  5.61  14.26  191,294
ln(retail employment) 11.55  1.48  4.09  13.42  191,294
Employment/population 0.40  0.09  0.18  0.82  191,294
Other County Variables
GAIN part. rate  0.14  0.10  0  0.93  191,294
GAIN $/partic. (1000s) 2.16 1.45  0  8.01  191,294
Neighborhood Variables
Urban-Inside 0.86  0  1  181,728
Urban-Outside 0.10  0  1  181,728
Rural  0.04    0  1  181,728
MEDHINC (1000s) 30.743  9.418  4.999  88.539  181,728
%FEMNVMAR 0.25  0.07  0  0.77  181,728
Source: Author’s tabulations of LDB 1 percent case file. There is one observation per monthly
transition in the welfare spells data.31
The only individual characteristics that are time varying are the number and ages of children.
27




Table 5 presents the initial estimates from the discrete duration model before adding any labor
market variables. The first specification in Table 5 includes dummies for spell duration (to control for
duration effects), the AFDC&FO guarantee, and family demographic characteristics such as age of
head, number and ages of children, AFDC eligibility type, and race/ethnicity. The demographic
variables are set as of the beginning of the spell and are not time varying.  Duration dummies for a
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single month are provided for the first twelve months in the spell, followed by dummies for three-
month periods for the next two years, followed by dummies for six-month periods for the last three
years. This model was selected after extensive testing using conventional testing methods. The duration
effects from the logit model, not shown here, show the same pattern as the unconditional hazard in
Figure 3. The probability of exiting welfare rises for the first few months, then declines steadily
throughout the length of the spell. These duration dummies are jointly significant at the 1 percent level
in all specifications. The individual significance of the dummies is strong through spell lengths of three
years, but the standard error is quite large for the last few periods. The dependent variable is an exit
from welfare. Therefore, a positive coefficient implies that an increase in the covariate leads to higher
exit probabilities and shorter spells.
These results show that longer spells are found for younger mothers with more children, and
with younger children. Single-parent families headed by men tend to have shorter spells than those
headed by women. This may be due to better labor market opportunities that are not being controlled
for in the regression. These results also show significant differences by race. Hispanics and blacks32
TABLE 5
Estimates from Discrete Duration Model (All Spells)
                   (1)                                       (2)                   
Estimate Standard Error Estimate Standard Error
Head 20–24 0.163*** (0.048) 0.174*** (0.050)
Head 25–34 0.150*** (0.049) 0.149*** (0.050)
Head 35–44 0.200*** (0.056) 0.205*** (0.058)
Head 45–54 0.070 (0.076) 0.087 (0.079)
Hispanic -0.119*** (0.029) -0.042  (0.031)
Black -0.273*** (0.030) -0.148*** (0.035)
Filipino -0.158** (0.067) -0.107 (0.070)
Cambodian -1.250*** (0.221) -1.188*** (0.232)
Laotian -1.190*** (0.203) -1.086*** (0.204)
Vietnamese -1.430*** (0.134) -1.369*** (0.137)
Other race -0.165 (0.142) -0.126 (0.146)
Number of children -0.053*** (0.013) -0.056*** (0.014)
Pregnant -0.334*** (0.049) -0.345*** (0.051)
Youngest child 3–5 0.042  (0.032) 0.032  (0.033)
Youngest child 6+ 0.141*** (0.033) 0.148*** (0.035)
Male head  0.367*** (0.064) 0.343*** (0.066)





GAIN $ per participant  -0.022** (0.009)
GAIN participation rate 0.208* (0.113)
AFDC&FO guarantee 0.003*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001)
Constant -6.047*** (0.454) -5.941*** (0.480)
Duration dummies yes yes
Number of observations 191,294 181,728
Log likelihood -32,147 -30,176
Source: Author’s tabulations of LDB 1 percent file.
Notes: Asterisks indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10 percent (*), 5
percent (**), and 1 percent (***) level.33
Upon arrival in the United States, refugees are immediately enrolled in public assistance
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programs, and the conditions to maintain eligibility are more lenient than for other AFDC participants.
This may also contribute to their longer spells. California has a large number of refugees relative to
other states. The main results of the paper hold when persons in these racial groups are dropped from
the sample.
The implication of omitting important individual covariates can also be addressed by allowing
29
for unobserved heterogeneity such as in Blank (1989). Fitzgerald (1994) finds that adding unobserved
heterogeneity does not change the importance of the labor market effects. Further, the importance of
unobserved heterogeneity has been found to be small when a flexible form for duration effects is
included (Meyer 1990).
both have longer spells than whites, with blacks having the longest spells. This is consistent with
analyses of young women on welfare using the NLSY (Gritz and MaCurdy 1992). Cambodians,
Laotians, and Vietnamese are found to have dramatically longer spells than other ethnic groups. Most
AFDC recipients from these countries are recent immigrants with current or previous refugee status.
These groups are generally thought to have longer spells than native-born individuals due to limited
English proficiency and labor market skills.  The coefficient on AFDC&FO has the wrong sign,
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implying that increases in welfare benefits lead to shorter spells. This variable, however, exhibits only
time variation and may be proxying for other trends in the state. Once the time effects are added to the
regression, the benefit variable is not identified and is dropped from the regression.
The second specification in Table 5 adds controls for selected county and neighborhood
variables. The neighborhood variables, assigned by zip code using the 1990 Census, are included as
crude controls for omitted individual characteristics such as education, prior labor market experience,
and marital status, all of which are important predictors of welfare dependency (Bane and Ellwood
1983) and may also be correlated with the labor market variables. For example, it is possible that “bad”
neighborhoods as captured by high poverty rates and low education levels are more likely to be located
in areas with depressed labor markets. By omitting neighborhood effects, one would get a biased
estimate of the role of labor markets in welfare dependency.  Because of the limited number of
29
individual covariates available in the data, the coefficients on the neighborhood variables should not be34
It is difficult empirically to separately identify effects that operate through one’s own
30
background characteristics compared to the effects that operate though the characteristics of one’s local
area (neighborhood effects). In this study, the prevalence of omitted individual characteristics makes
the interpretation even more difficult. In addition, the neighborhood variables are assigned based on the
current residence for the individual. Given the emphasis in the literature on schools and other
institutional features, the neighborhood where one was raised may also be important. The difficulties
associated with identifying neighborhood and family effects is well recognized in the literature and is
discussed at length by Jencks and Mayer (1990).
In addition to the variables presented in model (2), race-specific high school graduation rates,
31
poverty rates, and employment rates were examined. The neighborhood variables are highly collinear
so only a subset is presented. Many alternative specifications were estimated and the results are not
sensitive to the particular specification presented here.
interpreted as “neighborhood effects.”  The estimates in (2) show that persons living in urban areas,
30
with lower median household income and with more never-married women, have longer AFDC
spells.  Adding these neighborhood variables dramatically reduces the differences between whites,
31
Hispanics, and blacks, resulting in no significant differences between Hispanics and whites.
Model (2) in Table 5 also shows that higher GAIN participation is associated with shorter spells
and higher GAIN expenditures per participant with longer spells. Interpreting this as a pure program
effect would suggest that GAIN is successful at moving participants from welfare to work. Higher
GAIN expenditures may be a result of more intensive training programs that might delay employment.
The evaluation of the GAIN program supports these interpretations (Riccio, Friedlander, and Freedman
1994).
Table 6 explores the economic significance of the covariates by presenting selected
characteristics of the estimated spell durations for alternative values for the covariates using the
estimates of model (2) in Table 5. The table includes estimates of the probability the spell is completed
in less than six months, twelve months, two years, and four years. The first row of Table 6 gives the
predicted values for the spell distribution using baseline characteristics (described in the table). The
largest effects are found for race of the head, age of the youngest child, and gender of the head. For
example, only 39 percent of spells for pregnant women without any other children end35
TABLE 6
Effects of Changes of Demographic Variables on the Distribution of Spell Length
              Probability that a Completed Spell Lasts               
Median
Length
<=6 Months <=1 Year  <=2 Years <=4 Years of Spell
Baseline 0.299 0.502 0.701 0.769 12
Male head 0.390 0.621 0.814 0.853 9
No. Children =2 0.286 0.483 0.681 0.754 13
No. Children =4 0.261 0.446 0.640 0.723 14
Pregnant 0.225 0.392 0.577 0.671 18
Youngest child 3–5 0.307 0.513 0.712 0.778 12
Youngest child 6+ 0.337 0.553 0.752 0.808 11
AFDC-UP 0.327 0.540 0.739 0.798 11
Hispanic 0.289 0.488 0.686 0.758 13
Black 0.265 0.453 0.648 0.729 14
Cambodian 0.105 0.195 0.312 0.414 59
Laotian 0.115 0.213 0.339 0.443 51
Vietnamese 0.089 0.166 0.269 0.364 —
a
Teen parent  0.265 0.453 0.648 0.728 14
Parent 20–24 0.305 0.510 0.709 0.776 12
Parent 35–44 0.313 0.521 0.720 0.784 12
Parent 45–54 0.285 0.481 0.679 0.753 13
Urban-Inside 0.299 0.502 0.701 0.769 12
Urban-Outside 0.321 0.531 0.731 0.792 12
Rural 0.344 0.562 0.761 0.815 11
MEDHINC +20% 0.309 0.515 0.714 0.780 12
%FEMNVMAR +0.07 0.288 0.486 0.684 0.756 13
GAINPT +0.10 0.299 0.501 0.700 0.769 12
GAIN $/PT +10% 0.378 0.606 0.801 0.844 9
AFDCFO +10% 0.359 0.582 0.780 0.828 10
Source: Authors tabulations of LDB 1 percent file.
Notes: Simulations are based on estimates from model 2 in Table 5. Baseline case is a white, single
mother age 25–34 with one child under the age 3, living inside the central city. All other variables are
set to their mean values. The changes in the continuous variables are approximately equal to the
variable’s standard deviation.
The median for this group is longer than the sample period of 6 years.
a36
This table and the remaining tables of estimates suppresses all covariates except the labor
32
market variables. The full set of estimates is available from the author.
within one year compared to 55 percent of spells where the youngest child is over age 6. Because the
existence of pregnancy benefits is not particularly well known, this large difference for first-time
pregnancies may reflect unobserved differences concerning the propensity to have a long spell. Single-
parent families headed by men are 24 percent more likely to complete a spell within a year compared to
female-headed households. Black families and teen parents are both 10 percent less likely to complete
spells within one year. Individuals in rural areas have the shortest spells while those living inside
urbanized areas have the longest spells. The other neighborhood variables and GAIN variables are
statistically significant but have fairly small impacts on the length of the welfare spell.
Results Based on Unemployment Rates. To begin the examination of labor market variables, let
us consider the effects of unemployment rates and wages on the length of welfare spells. I have argued
above that employer-based data is preferable to unemployment rates but I start with unemployment
rates in order to compare my results to those in the literature. The results using average wages and
unemployment rates are provided in Table 7.  The first specification does not include county or time
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effects and shows that the county unemployment rate has a negative and significant effect on welfare
spells, implying that higher unemployment rates lead to longer spells. Higher earnings are associated
with longer spells, which (although insignificant) is the opposite of what theory would predict. Because
of many omitted county variables, it is not clear how to interpret this coefficient. For example, higher
earnings may reflect a higher skilled employment base that may not be accessible to the average
welfare participant. In order to control for the differences between the counties, specification (2)
includes county fixed effects for the fifty-eight California counties. Comparing the results to those in
(1), adding county fixed effects turns the coefficient on average earnings from negative and
insignificant to positive and significant and increases the magnitude of the37
TABLE 7
Estimates from Discrete Duration Model: County Unemployment Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Unemployment rate -0.032*** -0.039*** -0.006  -0.003 -0.002 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Quarterly earnings, -0.027 0.269*** 0.237***
   all industries (1000s) (0.017) (0.045) (0.047)
Quarterly earnings, services  0.151***
   (1000s) (0.028)
Quarterly earnings, retail  0.024
   (1000s) (0.130)
Duration dummies yes yes yes yes yes
County fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Time effects yes yes yes
Number of observations 181,728 181,728 181,728 181,728 181,728
Log likelihood -30,162 -30,056 -30,014 -30,013 -30,024
Source: Author’s tabulations of LDB 1 percent file.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate that the coefficient is significantly different
from zero at the 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**), and 1 percent (***) level. Each specification also
includes individual and family characteristics, GAIN variables, and neighborhood variables.38
In results not shown here, adding controls for the percent distribution of employment by
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sector (1-digit SIC) also reverses the sign on quarterly wages. Though somewhat difficult to interpret,
these variables may control for differences in the skill composition of the labor market. These measures
do not exhibit much time series variation and are measured very imprecisely after county fixed effects
are included.
Examples include an increase in the state minimum wage and reductions in state AFDC
34
benefits.
unemployment effect by about 20 percent.  Thus, in contrast to the results in Fitzgerald 1994, adding
33
the county fixed effects makes the results stronger!
I suggested above that one reason this approach is preferred over the caseload approach is the
ability to control for duration effects. In order to examine the significance of including duration
dummies, I ran a specification that included only the unemployment rate, earnings, and a constant term.
In those results (not shown here) the coefficient on the unemployment rate was about 50 percent larger
than that presented in (1). On average, persons living in areas with higher unemployment rates have
longer spells, which accounts for the upward bias.
  Returning to the results in Table 7, with county fixed effects the results are identified from
within county changes in unemployment rates and wages. If there was some factor, such as a change in
state policy concerning poor families, that affected all counties in the state and was correlated with the
state’s local labor market conditions, then these estimates would be biased.  In order to address this
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possible bias, the third column of Table 7 adds period dummies to the model. This has no impact on the
wages but renders the unemployment rate small and insignificant. There are at least two explanations
for this result. The first is that the unemployment rate is measured with a lot of error. Once county and
time effects are added, what remains is mostly noise. The second is that there is not enough variation in
the trends in local labor market conditions across the counties to separately identify county, time, and
labor market effects. As we will see below, the alternative measures of job opportunities are robust to39
A risk of estimating heavily saturated models such as this one (including time and county
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effects) is that the controls will absorb some of the effects of interest. For example, suppose that county
labor markets have persistent differences or that there is some common (state) seasonal component to
employment patterns. Blanchard and Katz (1992) find that shocks to state labor markets tend to be
transitory, disappearing within about ten years.
Note that adding employment growth directly in the regression, with or without county fixed
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effects, shows very similar results to those presented here.
including time effects. For this reason, and because an imputation procedure is necessary to construct
county-level unemployment rate series, measurement error is the more likely explanation.
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In specifications (4) and (5), the average earnings variable is replaced by average earnings in
services and average earnings in retail trade. Earnings in services prove to be important for welfare
recipients, but surprisingly, earnings in retail trade are not statistically significant. This result is quite
robust and holds for alternative controls for job availability and holds in the absence of the period
effects. An analysis of variance shows that retail earnings vary less over time than service earnings,
which may explain this result. As we will see below, retail sector employment growth is important.
Results Based on Employment. Table 8 presents estimates that replace the unemployment rate
with the log of employment in the county. Each of the specifications in the table include county fixed
effects. Accordingly, the coefficient on log employment captures the effects of employment growth on
the probability of leaving welfare.  The table shows that in each specification, higher employment and
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wage growth lead to significantly shorter spells. These estimates are virtually unchanged by the
inclusion of period effects, shown in column 2. The last two columns of Table 8 replace the log of
county employment with the log of service employment (model 3) and retail trade (model 4). This
shows that higher growth in retail trade and service employment lead to shorter spells.
Results Based on Employment-to-Population Ratio. The final measure of job availability is the
employment-to-population ratio. The results, presented in Table 9, are qualitatively very similar to log
employment regressions. Higher wages and employment-to-population ratios are associated with40
TABLE 8
Estimates from Discrete Duration Model: County Employment Growth





ln(retail trade emp) 0.662**
(0.268)
Quarterly earnings (1000s) 0.235*** 0.234*** 0.206*** 0.231***
(0.044) (0.047) (0.049) (0.048)
Duration dummies yes yes yes yes
County fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Time effects yes yes yes
Number of observations 181,728 181,728 181,728 181,728
Log likelihood -30,066 -30,009  -30,009 -30,013
Source: Author’s tabulations of LDB 1 percent file.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate that the coefficient is significantly different
from zero at the 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**), and 1 percent (***) level. Each specification also
includes individual and family characteristics, GAIN variables, and neighborhood variables.41
TABLE 9
Estimates from Discrete Duration Model: County Employment-to-Population Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employment/population 5.115*** 2.509*** 2.040** 1.845**
(0.603) (0.899) (0.892) (0.895)
Quarterly earnings (1000s) 0.294*** 0.254***
(0.045) (0.047)
Quarterly earnings, services 0.154***
   (1000s) (0.028)
Quarterly earnings, retail -0.006
   (1000s) (0.130)
Duration dummies yes yes yes yes
County fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Time effects yes yes yes
Number of observations 181,728 181,728 181,728 181,728
Log likelihood -30,038 -30,011 -30,010 -30,025
Source: Author’s tabulations of LDB 1 percent file.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate that the coefficient is significantly different
from zero at the 5 percent (**) and 1 percent (***) level. Each specification also includes individual
and family characteristics, GAIN variables, and neighborhood variables.42
significantly shorter spells. Adding time effects reduces the size of the employment-to-population ratio
by about 50 percent, but the wage results remain unchanged. The results in the last two columns, which
are consistent with the results in Table 7, show that service sector earnings growth, but not retail trade
growth, leads to shorter spells. In general, it is striking how consistent the estimates are for the earnings
variables across the different specifications shown in these three tables.
Simulated Effects of Changes in Labor Market Variables
The results in Tables 7–9 suggest that labor market variables play a statistically significant role
in determining the length of AFDC spells. However, it is difficult to interpret the magnitude of their
impact because of the nonlinear specification. Table 10 presents simulations of the effects of changes in
labor market variables on the distribution of the length of welfare spells. Each of the seven panels in the
table present the simulations for a different specification of the model. The figures in the table show the
percentage change (relative to the baseline specification) in the probability that a spell is completed
within a given time period for a given change in the labor market variable. Each of the simulated
changes in the labor market variables represent typical within county changes in the variable observed
over the period from 1987 to 1992. In general, these can be interpreted as variations we might expect
between the peak and the trough of a business cycle.
Panel (A) presents estimates from model (2) in Table 7, which includes controls for the
unemployment rate, quarterly earnings, and county fixed effects. The first row of the table shows that a
decrease in the unemployment rate of 3 percentage points leads to a 10 percent increase in the
probability that a spell lasts six months or less, and an 8.6 percent increase in the probability that a spell
lasts one year or less. In the last column of the table the distribution is summarized by showing the
effect on the AFDC caseload assuming that the entry rate into AFDC is constant, and that the effect is
permanent. These results show that a 3 percentage-point reduction in the unemployment rate43
TABLE 10
Percentage Change in Distribution of AFDC Spells under Alternative Labor Market Conditions
 Percentage Change in Probability that a Completed Spell Lasts  Percentage
Change in
<=6 months <=1 year  <=2 years <=4 years Caseload
a
(A) Unemployment Rate with County Fixed Effects: Table 7, model (2)
Unemp. Rate -.03 10.2% 8.6%  6.5% 4.5% -10.0%
Earnings +5%  7.7% 6.5% 5.0% 3.5% -8.0%
(B) Employment Growth with County and Time Effects: Table 8, model (2) 
Employment +10% 9.0% 7.3% 5.3% 3.6% -9.7%
Earnings +5%  6.5% 5.3% 3.8% 2.6% -7.1%
(C) Employment Growth with County and Time Effects: Table 8, model (3) 
Services employment +10% 7.0% 5.7% 4.1% 2.8% -7.7%
Earnings +5%  5.7% 4.6% 3.3% 2.3% -6.3%
(D) Employment Growth with County and Time Effects: Table 8, model (4) 
Retail employment +10% 5.4% 4.5% 3.2% 2.2% -6.0%
Earnings +5%  6.4% 5.2% 3.8% 2.6% -7.0%
(E) Employment-to-Population Ratio with County and Time Effects: Table 9, model (2)
Emp/Pop +.035 7.2% 5.9% 4.2% 2.9% -8.0%
Earnings +5%  7.0% 5.7% 4.1% 2.8% -7.8%
(F) Employment-to-Population Ratio with County and Time Effects: Table 9, model (3)
Emp/Pop +.035 5.9% 4.8% 3.5% 2.4% -6.5%
Earnings, services +5%  4.1% 3.4% 2.5% 1.7% -4.6%
(G) Employment-to-Population Ratio with County and Time Effects: Table 9, model (4)
Emp/Pop +.035 5.3% 4.4% 3.2% 2.2% -5.9%
Earnings, retail trade +5%  -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% -0.0% 0.1%
Notes: Baseline case is a white, single mother age 25–34 with one child under the age of 3. All other
variables are set equal to their mean values. Changes in labor market variables represent median changes
within counties over the sample period.
Changes in caseload calculated assuming the change is permanent and the entry rate is constant.
a44
Clearly the assumption of constant entry rate is not a valid one. However, this is a convenient
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way to summarize the effect of changes in labor market variables on the distribution of spells. 
Assuming that the entry rate was countercyclical—rising in periods of economic downturns—the
results here would be strengthened.
would lead to a 10 percent reduction in the AFDC caseload and that a 5 percent increase in real
quarterly earnings would lead to an 8 percent reduction in the caseload.
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The next three panels present simulations using the log of employment as the measure of job
opportunities, where each specification includes time and county fixed effects. Panel (B) shows that a
10 percent increase in county employment, if permanent, would lead to a 9.7 percent reduction in the
caseload. A 10 percent increase in service or retail employment shows slightly lower reductions in the
caseload. The last three panels present simulations using the employment-to-population ratio. Here a
3.5 percentage-point increase in the ratio leads to an 8 percent reduction in the caseload while a 5
percent real increase in earnings leads to a 7.8 percent reduction in the caseload. Panel (F) shows that a
5 percent increase in real service sector earnings leads to a 5 percent reduction in the caseload. These
results, and those for employment above, suggest that the service sector is less important for welfare
recipients than the industrywide measures. Given that welfare participants are disproportionately
represented in the service and retail trade sectors (Brandon 1995), this is somewhat surprising. For
comparability, the simulated changes in service and retail trade earnings (and employment) have been
set at the same level as that used for the aggregate variable. In most cases, however, services and retail
trade grew more than the industrywide variable and using the actual changes results in larger reductions
in the caseload than those shown here.
The simulations in Table 10 show that there is a great deal of uniformity in the estimates across
the various specifications for the local labor market conditions. On average, a typical fluctuation in job
opportunities over a business cycle (from trough to peak), if permanent, would lead to an 8–10 percent
reduction in the AFDC caseload. Typical changes in earnings lead to a 7–8 percent reduction in the45
caseload. These changes can add up to large effects. For example, an increase in employment growth of
10 percent combined with a 5 percent real increase in earnings would lead to a 16.2 percent reduction in
the AFDC caseload.
Results for Demographic Groups
Previous research has found significant differences in the responsiveness of different groups of
welfare recipients to changes in tax and transfer environment (for a review, see Moffitt 1992).
Descriptive tables presented earlier also revealed that the average length of welfare spells differs, in
some cases substantially, across demographic groups. Accordingly, we may expect to see differences in
the responsiveness to labor market conditions, which may be very important for policy purposes. Table
11 presents estimates from regressions which allow for differential effects across various demographic
groups, where two regressions are estimated for each group. These specifications are identical to those
presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 9 and include the employment-to-population ratio and the
earnings variable. The first specification includes county effects and the second includes county and
time effects. All parameters are allowed to vary, although the table shows only the estimates for the
labor market variables. For comparison, the first panel of Table 11 shows the results for all families.
The bracketed figures in the table give the percentage change in the caseload resulting from a specified
change in the labor market variable, as calculated in the last column of Table 10 (and the magnitude of
the changes in the labor market variables match those presented there).
In general, the results with time effects are less precisely estimated, but the coefficients show
similar patterns. The second panel shows that AFDC-UP families are more sensitive to labor market
conditions than single-parent families. This is sensible since AFDC-UP families contain two potential
earners, and since they typically have more substantial labor market experience and higher potential
wages than single-parent recipients (Hoynes 1996). This is also consistent with the aggregate caseload
studies that find greater sensitivity for AFDC-UP caseloads (Peskin 1993). Results not reported in the46
TABLE 11
Estimated Labor Market Effects by Demographic Group
Number of           No Time Effects                       Time Effects            
Observations Emp/Pop Earnings (1000s)  Emp/Pop Earnings (1000s) 
All 154,577 5.115*** 0.294*** 2.509*** 0.254***
(0.603) (0.045) (0.899) (0.047)
[-15.8%] [-8.9%] [-8.0%] [-7.8%]
FG (single-parent) 155,442 4.823*** 0.292*** 2.283** 0.272***
(0.656) (0.048) (0.996) (0.051)
[-14.9%] [-8.8%] [-7.2%] [-8.2%]
UP (two-parent) 26,133 6.632*** 0.294** 3.571 0.137
(1.583) (0.129) (2.175) (0.136)
[-20.2%] [-9.8%] [-11.2%] [-4.2%]
White 79,997 4.683*** 0.316*** 0.860 0.230***
(0.911) (0.070) (1.299) (0.074)
[-14.6%] [-9.6%] [-2.8%] [-7.0%]
Black 45,181 4.980*** 0.340*** 0.984 0.342***
(1.286) (0.085) (2.286) (0.092)
[-15.3%] [-10.2%] [-3.1%] [-10.2%]
Hispanic 40,900 4.935*** 0.147 5.409*** 0.170*
(1.159) (0.089) (1.718) (0.096)
[-15.2%] [-4.5%] [-16.6%] [-5.2%]
Teen head 17,916 2.781 0.564*** -3.015 0.487***
(2.179) (0.145) (3.496) (0.155)
[-9.1%] [-16.2%] [9.9%] [-14.1%]
Nonteen head 163,673 5.331*** 0.266*** 2.986*** 0.230***
(0.629) (0.047) (0.933) (0.050)
[-16.4%] [-8.1%] [-9.4%] [-7.0%]
Urban-Inside 156,314 5.750*** 0.280*** 3.546*** 0.246***
(0.663) (0.047) (1.077) (0.050)
[-17.7%] [-8.5%] [-11.1%] [-7.5%]
Urban-Outside  17,411 2.887 0.377** -0.225 0.246
(1.927) (0.186) (2.450) (0.198)
[-9.0%] [-11.2%] [0.7%] [-7.4%]
Rural  7,608 1.887 0.611** 0.146 0.486*
(2.712) (0.257) (3.179) (0.274)
[-5.9%] [-17.6%] [-0.5%] [-14.2%]
Notes: Two regressions are run for each demographic group, one with time effects and one without. The regressions
also control for family characteristics, neighborhood variables, duration dummies, and county fixed effects. The full
set of estimates is available from the author.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Asterisks indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**), and 1
percent (***) level. The numbers in brackets [ ] are the percentage change in the caseload, as calculated in the last
column of Table 10. 47
Some of these results are not particularly robust. For example, when the employment-to-
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population ratio is replaced by the log of employment, UP families are no longer found to have
significantly greater sensitivity. In some specifications, the differences between the racial/ethnic groups
is much stronger than those presented here. In general, the large standard errors on many of the
estimates is reflected in part by the smaller sample sizes and the difference between groups is not
statistically significant. In future work, estimating non-fully interacted models may clear up these
inconsistencies.
table suggest that there are other important differences in the determinants of welfare spells for the two
groups. For example, while the spells for single parents with preschool-age children are significantly
longer than those with older children, this is not true for UP recipients. This seems sensible since two-
parent families are more able to specialize in home production and labor market participation. Hispanic
two-parent families have significantly shorter spells than their white counterparts, while Hispanic
single-parent families tend to stay on welfare longer than white families.
  The third panel of Table 11 shows that whites are found to be slightly less (although not
significantly less) sensitive to labor market conditions than either blacks or Hispanics. This result is
also found in Fitzgerald (1994 1995) and is consistent with the evidence that white women are more
likely to leave welfare through marriage and less likely to leave welfare through employment relative to
blacks (Bane and Ellwood 1983; Blank 1989; Blank and Ruggles 1996). The results also show that teen
parents are not sensitive to changes in job opportunities, perhaps reflecting their lack of work
experience and labor force attachment. Residents of urban areas are more sensitive to changes in labor
market conditions compared to nonurban groups.
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In general, these results are consistent with the literature on the effects of local economic
conditions on labor market outcomes of different demographic groups. Bartik (1991) and Bound and
Holzer (1995) find larger responses to changes in economic conditions for blacks, less educated
workers, and older workers. They argue that this is due to lower migration rates among these groups.
When the economy turns down, workers with lower propensities to migrate are hurt more by the48
Long (1988), in a comprehensive analysis of migration patterns over the past three decades,
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finds the likelihood of moving within a county to be over two and a half  times more likely than moving
across counties (within a state). This difference is particularly striking for public assistance recipients
who are five times more likely to move within counties than across them. In the LDB sample, about 9
percent of families are observed to move across county lines. The probability of moving is higher for
whites, younger heads, and families headed by women.
downturn relative to those with higher migration propensities. This is an alternative explanation for the
greater sensitivity among blacks, Hispanics, and possibly female-headed households.
Extensions
The county fixed effects will control for unobserved county factors that are fixed over time. If
there are changes over the sample, such as those induced by endogenous location decisions, then the
estimates will be biased. For example, if families that are likely to have long spells move from
relatively strong labor markets to relatively weak ones, the estimates will be biased in favor of finding a
labor market effect. To address this, we use information on the family’s county of residence at the
beginning of the spell to assign the labor market variables. This information is used in both a reduced
form and instrumental variables (IV) estimation procedure. The reduced form model simply assigns the
county fixed effect and labor market variables based on county of residence at the beginning of the
spell instead of current county of residence. The IV estimates instrument for the current county labor
market variables using the labor market variables for the initial county. These results are shown in
Table 12. Each of the specifications match that used in model (2) of Table 9 and include employment-
to-population ratio, earnings, county effects, and time effects. These results show that the estimates for
employment-to-population ratio are reduced somewhat, but remain statistically significant. The
earnings parameter remains unchanged. The robustness to this extension is not surprising since
migration rates are fairly low in this population, especially between counties.
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I have hypothesized that a welfare entrant’s average level of job readiness will be higher for
those entering during bad times compared to good. If this is true, the main estimates will understate49
TABLE 12
Estimates of Duration Model Controlling for Endogeneity of Location
  Main Estimates
Table 9, Model (2) Reduced Form  Instrumental Variables
Employment/population  2.509*** 1.458** 1.578**
(0.809) (0.765) (0.823)
Quarterly earnings, all 0.254*** 0.216*** 0.230***
   industries (1000s) (0.047) (0.043) (0.046)
Duration dummies yes yes yes
County fixed effects yes yes yes
Time effects yes yes yes
Number of observations 181,728 181,728 181,728
Note: Asterisks indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent (**) and
1 percent (***) level.50
the effect of local labor market conditions on welfare spells. In an attempt to control for the
composition of the entry population, I included several variables measuring the absolute and relative
economic conditions during the period that the spell began. In each of these specifications, the variables
were insignificant and the main results did not change.
7. CONCLUSION 
This study shows that local labor market conditions have a significant impact on welfare spells
for most demographic groups. Minorities, residents of urban areas, and two-parent families are more
sensitive to changes in local labor market conditions. The results are robust to including county fixed
effects and time effects. On average, a typical employment fluctuation over the business cycle (from
trough to peak), if permanent, would lead to an 8–10 percent decrease in the AFDC caseload. Typical
changes in quarterly earnings generate somewhat smaller effects. The combined effect of these two
changes, if permanent, would lead to sizeable reductions in the caseload, on the order of 15 percent.
Can economic growth alone eliminate the reliance on public assistance? The results in this
paper, I believe, show that the answer is no. Optimistic assumptions about permanent increases in
employment and wages reduce but do not eliminate the demand for welfare. However, this is a case of
whether the glass is half empty or half full. It is equally important to point out that there is a significant
relationship between economic conditions and welfare exits, which contribute to the mounting evidence
that employment is an increasingly important route for achieving independence. Thus, if time limits for
welfare recipients are implemented, then linking them to local labor market conditions may be
important.
The impacts in this study may underestimate the true effect of local labor markets on welfare
spells for two reasons. First, as mentioned in the introduction, local economic conditions may affect
both entry into welfare as well as length of time on welfare conditional on entry. We would expect that,51
on average, individuals entering welfare during bad times will have higher skill levels and shorter spells
than those entering in good times. This factor alone will lead to a negative relationship between
economic conditions and spell lengths. Second, this sample does not contain any information about
post-welfare employment. Not all those exiting AFDC are entering employment. A competing risks
model, with employment as one of the routes off welfare, would likely show larger labor market
effects. Lastly, the earnings measures used in this study are fairly crude, measuring at best variation in
the returns to work in one-digit industry classes. Welfare recipients typically obtain low-skilled jobs
and, given the relative decline in wages for low-wage workers, using a more disaggregate wage
measure may show larger effects.5253
References
Acs, Gregory, and Douglas Wissoker. 1991. “The Impact of Local Labor Markets on the Employment
Patterns of Young Inner-City Males.” Mimeo, Urban Institute.
Bane, Mary Jo, and David T. Ellwood. 1983. “The Dynamics of Dependence: The Routes to Self-
Sufficiency.” Prepared for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation. Cambridge: Urban Systems Research and
Engineering, Inc.
Bartik, Timothy J. 1991. Who Benefits from State and Local Economic Development Policies?
Kalamazoo, Mich.: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Bartik, Timothy J. Forthcoming. “The Distributional Effects of Local Labor Demand and Industrial
Mix.” Journal of Urban Economics.
Blanchard, Olivier J., and Lawrence F. Katz. 1992. “Regional Evolutions.” Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity 1: 1–61.
Blank, Rebecca. 1989. “Analyzing the Length of Welfare Spells.” Journal of Public Economics 39(3):
245–73.
Blank, Rebecca, and Patricia Ruggles. 1996. “When Do Women Use AFDC and Food Stamps? The
Dynamics of Eligibility versus Participation.”Journal of Human Resources 31(1): 57–89.
Bound, John, and Harry Holzer. 1993. “Industrial Shifts, Skill Levels, and the Labor Market for White
and Black Males.” Review of Economics and Statistics (August): 387–96.
Bound, John, and Harry Holzer. 1995. “Structural Changes, Employment Outcomes, and Population
Adjustments among Whites and Blacks: 1980–1990.” Institute for Research on Poverty
Discussion Paper no. 1057-95. Madison: Institute for Research on Poverty, University of
Wisconsin.
Brandon, Peter. 1995. “What Happens to Mothers after AFDC?” Focus 17:2(Fall/Winter): 13–15.
Cain, Glen, and Ross Finnie. 1990. “The Black-White Difference in Youth Employment: Evidence
from Demand-Side Factors.” Journal of Labor Economics 8: S364–95.
California Department of Social Services. 1994. Unpublished memo on child-only cases
Duncan, Greg J., and Saul D. Hoffman. 1990. “Welfare Benefits, Economic Opportunities, and Out-of-
Wedlock Births among Teenage Girls.” Demography 27(4): 519–35.
Ellwood, David T. 1986. “Targeting Would-Be Long-Term Recipients of AFDC.” Prepared for the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning
and Evaluation. Princeton, N.J.: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. 54
Fitzgerald, John. 1992. “Welfare Durations and the Marriage Market: Evidence from the Survey of
Income and Program Participation.” Journal of Human Resources 26(3): 545–61.
Fitzgerald, John. 1994. “A Hazard Model for Welfare Durations with Unobserved Location-Specific
Effects.” Mimeo, Bowdoin College. 
Fitzgerald, John. 1995. “Local Labor Markets and Local Area Effects on Welfare Duration.” Journal of
Policy Analysis and Management 14(1): 43–67.
Freeman, Richard. 1981. “Economic Determinants of Geographic and Individual Variation in the Labor
Market Position of Young Persons.” In The Youth Labor Market Problem: Its Nature, Causes,
and Consequences, ed. R Freeman and D. Wise. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Gritz, Mark, and Thomas MaCurdy. 1992. “Transitions from Welfare to Work.” Prepared for the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and
Evaluation. Mimeo, Stanford University.
Harris, Kathleen. 1993. “Work and Welfare among Single Mothers in Poverty.” American Journal of
Sociology 99(September): 317–52.
Heckman, James. 1981. “The Incidental Parameters Problem and the Problem of Initial Conditions in
Estimating a Discrete Time-Discrete Data Stochastic Process.” In Structural Analysis of
Discrete Data with Econometric Applications, ed. Charles Manski and Daniel McFadden.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Heckman, James, and Burton Singer. 1984. “Econometric Duration Analysis.” Journal of Econometrics
24: 63–132.
Holzer, Harry J. 1991. “Employment, Unemployment, and Demand Shifts in Local Labor Markets.”
Review of Economics and Statistics: 25–32.
 
Hotz, V. Joseph, Lixin Xu, Marta Tienda, and Avner Ahituv. 1995. “The Returns to Early Work
Experience in the Transition from School to Work for Young Men in the U.S.” Mimeo,
University of Chicago.
Hoynes, Hilary Williamson. 1996. “Welfare Transfers in Two-Parent Families: Labor Supply and
Welfare Participation under the AFDC-UP Program.” Econometrica 64(2): 295–332.
Hoynes, Hilary Williamson, and Thomas MaCurdy. 1993. “Welfare Spells over the Last Two Decades:
Do Changes in Benefits Explain the Trends?” Mimeo, University of California, Berkeley.
Hoynes, Hilary Williamson, and Thomas MaCurdy. 1994. “Has the Decline in Benefits Shortened
Welfare Spells?” American Economic Review 84(2): 43–48.
Jencks, Christopher, and Susan Mayer. 1990. “The Social Consequences of Growing Up in a Poor
Neighborhood.” In Inner-City Poverty in the United States, ed. Laurence Lynn and Michael
McGeary. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.55
Kalbfleisch, J. D., and R. L. Prentice. 1980. The Statistical Analysis of Failure Time Data. New York:
Wiley.
Lancaster, Tony. 1990. The Econometric Analysis of Transition Data. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Long, Larry. 1988. Migration and Residential Mobility in the United States. New York: Russell Sage
Foundation.
Manski, Charles F. 1993. “Identification of Endogenous Social Effects: The Reflection Problem.”
Review of Economic Studies 60: 531–42.
Meyer, Bruce. 1990. “Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells.” Econometrica 58(4):
757–82.
Moffitt, Robert. 1983. “An Economic Model of Welfare Stigma.” American Economic Review 73(5):
1023–35.
Moffitt, Robert. 1992. “Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review.” Journal of Economic
Literature 15(1): 1–61.
O’Neill, June A., Laurie J. Bassi, and Douglas A. Wolf. 1987. “The Duration of Welfare Spells.”
Research in Economics and Statistics 69: 241–48.
O’Neill, June A., Douglas A. Wolf, Laurie J. Bassi, and Michael T. Hannan. 1984. “An Analysis of
Time on Welfare.” Final report to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute. 
Pavetti, LaDonna. 1993. “The Dynamics of Welfare and Work: Exploring the Process by Which
Women Work Their Way Off Welfare.” Ph.D. diss., Harvard University.
Peskin, Janice. 1993. “Forecasting AFDC Caseloads, with an Emphasis on Economic Factors.” CBO
Staff Memorandum. July.
Riccio, James, Daniel Friedlander, and Stephen Freedman. 1994. GAIN Final Report: Benefits, Costs,
and Three-Year Impacts of a Welfare-to-Work Program. New York: Manpower Demonstration
Research Corporation.
Sanders, Seth. 1992. “Preliminary Evidence on Human Capital Production and Welfare Participation.”
Chapter 3 of unpublished Ph.D. diss.
Savner, Steve, and Mark Greenberg. 1995. The CLASP Guide to Welfare Waivers: 1991–1995.
Washington, D.C.: Center for Law and Social Policy. 
Sawhill, Isabel. 1995. Welfare Reform: An Analysis of the Issues. Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute. 56
UC Data. 1994. “California Work Pays Demonstration Project: Statewide Longitudinal
Database—Persons: 1 Percent Sample, 1987–1992.” Mimeo, University of California,
Berkeley.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 1992. BLS Handbook of Methods. Bulletin 2414. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Dept. of Labor/Government Printing Office.
U.S. House of Representatives. 1994. Background Materials and Data on Programs within the
Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office.
Winkler, Anne. 1994. “The Determinants of a Mother’s Choice of Family Structure: Labor Market
Conditions, AFDC Policy, or Community Mores?” Mimeo. University of Missouri–St. Louis. 